Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen stated that the initiative is not limited to the three participating countries and that other nations are welcome to join if they choose. The statement is widely viewed as a direct signal to India. The proposal closely resembles the earlier Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which failed to progress after India raised objections and expressed concerns over China's Belt and Road Initiative. China has now revived the concept through a revised three-country framework that excludes India.
Bangladesh has presented the project as a major economic opportunity, arguing that it will boost trade, modernize ports, and provide direct access to Chinese and Southeast Asian markets. A significant development is the government's decision to reassign the economic zone adjacent to Mongla Port. The site had previously been identified for an India-backed project but has now been allocated to a Chinese-supported company. The move is being viewed in New Delhi as a clear strategic indication that Dhaka is moving closer to Beijing.
Relations between China and Bangladesh are expanding beyond trade, with defence and diplomatic cooperation also advancing rapidly. Both countries have agreed to establish a 2+2 dialogue mechanism involving their Foreign and Defence Ministries. Agreements covering the Teesta River project, the development of Lalmonirhat Airport, a drone manufacturing facility, and technology transfer have heightened concerns among India's security agencies. Chinese involvement near India's eastern border is being monitored closely by New Delhi because of its potential strategic implications.
Despite its ambitious scope, the proposed corridor faces its biggest challenge in Myanmar. The planned route passes through areas affected by conditions resembling civil war. Rakhine State, where China is developing the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, remains engulfed in intense conflict. Myanmar's military administration has lost control over several strategically important areas. Security conditions have deteriorated to the extent that even Chinese-backed energy projects have been forced to relocate. Under these circumstances, the proposed road and railway connectivity appears unlikely to be implemented in the immediate future.
For India, overlooking the proposal could carry significant strategic consequences. China's broader objective appears to be securing access to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan while simultaneously expanding its reach to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar and Bangladesh. Such a strategy would increase strategic pressure on India across both maritime and land domains. The initiative is also viewed as part of China's long-term effort to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Malacca. Direct access to the Bay of Bengal could further strengthen China's naval presence across the Indian Ocean Region.
Strategic experts believe the initiative extends beyond economic connectivity and represents another phase of China's Maritime Silk Road strategy. Through ports, industrial zones, and transport networks, Beijing seeks to establish a lasting strategic footprint across South Asia. Following the development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan, the ports of Mongla, Chattogram, and Kyaukphyu could emerge as new pillars of China's expanding maritime strategy.
The proposal places India before a dual strategic challenge. New Delhi must preserve the strategic balance in its northeastern region and the Bay of Bengal while simultaneously strengthening trust and economic cooperation with neighbouring Bangladesh. Failure to respond effectively to the evolving geopolitical environment could allow China to further consolidate its influence across South Asia. Although the corridor remains at the proposal stage, its strategic message is unmistakable. China is redrawing its geopolitical map across South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, and India's eastern frontier could become the next major arena of regional strategic competition.
About The Author
Comment List