Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin held talks with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian as regional efforts to reduce tensions and restart negotiations continued.
The meetings are taking place about a week before the US midterm elections. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly indicated that he could resume bombing Iran after months of deadlock. Fears of another conflict have also pushed crude oil prices above $117 per barrel.
According to Iran’s state news agency IRIB News, Pezeshkian said during the meeting, “Iran is ready to take steps towards deepening regional cooperation, resolving differences and utilising the shared capabilities of Islamic countries.”
Pakistan has emerged as an important intermediary in efforts to advance the peace process following attacks by Israel and the United States on Iran. Its role is particularly significant given Tehran’s reasons for distrusting Islamabad, as well as the history of Iranian mistrust towards Saudi Arabia and the United States.
Pakistan, however, has been a close ally of both the United States and Saudi Arabia since its establishment. Despite these longstanding relationships, Iran continues to accept Pakistan’s mediation without publicly expressing distrust. Islamabad needs all three countries and has sought to avoid crossing any party’s red lines.
Saudi Arabia provides Pakistan with financial assistance and employment opportunities for millions of Pakistani workers. The United States facilitates Pakistan’s access to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international lenders. Iran, meanwhile, shares a border with Pakistan, making cooperation essential for security in Balochistan. Pakistan also depends heavily on Iran for energy security.
When trade with Iran was halted last week, the price of an LPG cylinder in Pakistan rose to 4,500 Pakistani rupees.
Trade between Pakistan and three of its four neighbouring countries—Iran, Afghanistan and India—is already disrupted. If Iran also becomes hostile towards Pakistan, the country risks being surrounded by unfriendly neighbours on almost every side.
Domestic considerations also shape Islamabad’s approach. Around 15–20 per cent of Pakistan’s population is Shia Muslim, making the country one of the largest Shia-populated countries outside Iran. For many Shia Muslims, Iran is a spiritual centre, and thousands of Pakistani pilgrims travel there every year.
Several experts believe that openly siding with one party could deepen divisions within Pakistan. During the 1980s and 1990s, financial assistance from Saudi Arabia to Sunni organisations and from Iran to Shia organisations turned Pakistan into an arena for the rivalry between the two countries.
Protests erupted in Pakistan following the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader. Maintaining friendly relations with Tehran is therefore also part of Islamabad’s strategy to preserve domestic peace.
Pakistan’s approach has been to defend Saudi Arabia without attacking Iran. Although it has been providing security support to Saudi Arabia, it has not participated in offensive military action against Iran.
In 2015, Pakistan’s Parliament declined to join the war in Yemen but promised to defend Saudi territory. Analysts at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) argue that this dual role can work only if military deployments remain strictly defensive, time-bound and clearly limited.
Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar has said that Islamabad reminded Iran of its defence agreement with Saudi Arabia. According to Dar, this helped limit Iran’s response towards Saudi Arabia and Oman. Pakistan’s relationship with Riyadh thus became a channel for preventing further escalation.
Islamabad condemns attacks on both Iran and the Gulf countries and calls for negotiations. This position allows it to address the concerns of both its Sunni and Shia citizens.
The United States needs a mediator with whom Iran is genuinely willing to negotiate. Saudi Arabia benefits from the support of Pakistani troops and gains a channel of communication with Iran without having to engage directly with Tehran. Iran, meanwhile, is isolated from much of the world and has limited alternatives. Despite these constraints, Iran’s Foreign Ministry continues to describe Pakistan as an important partner.
Pakistan has become a point of convergence for the interests of all three countries, giving Islamabad diplomatic influence. However, analysts question whether it can remain genuinely neutral.
The Australian Institute of International Affairs argues that Pakistan’s relationships with Saudi Arabia, China and the Gulf countries, along with the financial assistance it receives from them, make genuine neutrality “structurally impossible”.
A report published by House of Saud argues that the more commitments Pakistan undertakes, the more difficult its position becomes. Every additional security commitment increases the risk that Islamabad will eventually be forced to choose a side.
The Friday Times makes a similar argument, maintaining that the more actively Pakistan participates militarily in the Gulf region, the harder it becomes to convince Tehran that Islamabad can be trusted.
Signs of mounting pressure are already emerging. Iranian lawmakers have begun describing Pakistan as an “intervener”. Border closures and disruptions to LPG supplies also point towards growing strain in the relationship.
Pakistan is not entirely neutral. Its strategic orientation leans towards Saudi Arabia and the United States, but it is also seeking to avoid hostile relations with Iran.
This balance has survived because, for now, all three parties see greater benefits in allowing Pakistan to maintain its position than in forcing Islamabad to choose one side.
Iran’s trust in Pakistan has fluctuated over time. Relations between the two countries were close under the Shah of Iran, but the 1979 Islamic Revolution made Tehran’s approach more cautious and pragmatic. In recent years, Iran has alternated between expressing solidarity with Pakistan and raising suspicions about its intentions.
Longstanding areas of cooperation have provided a foundation for mutual trust, but disagreements over Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and security in the shared Baloch-populated border region have repeatedly weakened the relationship.
Iran was among the first countries to recognise Pakistan on August 14, 1947. In March 1950, the Shah became the first head of state to make an official visit to Pakistan. The two countries signed a friendship treaty in 1950.
During the Cold War, Pakistan, as a non-Arab Muslim country opposed to the communist bloc, became a natural partner of Iran under the Shah. Both countries joined the Baghdad Pact’s successor, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), in 1955 and the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) organisation in 1964.
During the 1965 war with India, Iran sent nurses, medical supplies and 5,000 tonnes of petroleum to Pakistan. It has also been reported that Pakistani aircraft used Iranian military bases. According to one scholar, the Shah violated US law in 1971 to deliver American weapons to Pakistan.
Iran is also reported to have helped suppress the Baloch insurgency that began after 1971. The Baloch ethnic community lives on both sides of the Pakistan-Iran border, and related security concerns continue to influence relations between the two countries.
Pakistan also supported Iran’s 1971 occupation of the Gulf islands of Tunb and Abu Musa.
The period between 1979 and 2001 marked a widening gap in bilateral relations. Pakistan was the first country to recognise the Islamic Republic of Iran, but experts say Islamabad subsequently moved closer to Saudi Arabia because of its strategic interests.
One of the most important foundations of trust between Iran and Pakistan has been Islamabad’s role in maintaining a channel of communication between Tehran and Washington.
According to media reports, Iran’s diplomatic office in the United States has operated from inside Pakistan’s embassy since March 1992. Pakistan took over the responsibility from Algeria at the time. This remains Iran’s only official presence in the United States.
There is substantial documentary evidence of assistance provided by Pakistani nuclear scientists to Iran’s nuclear programme, linked to the A. Q. Khan network.
During the 1990s, Pakistan supported the Sunni Taliban, while Iran backed the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Relations deteriorated sharply in 1998 after Iranian diplomats were killed in Mazar-i-Sharif. Sectarian violence within Pakistan also deepened Tehran’s suspicions.
In April 2015, Pakistan’s Parliament unanimously decided that the country would remain neutral in the Saudi-led war in Yemen. The decision came a day after Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visited Islamabad.
The United Arab Emirates accused Pakistan of choosing Iran over the Gulf countries. Tehran, however, remembers Islamabad’s decision not to join the Yemen war.
Iran has also long accused Pakistan of failing to take action against Jaish al-Adl, a Baloch Sunni militant organisation. Tehran has said it shared information about the group’s hideouts with Islamabad but that Pakistan did not take sufficient action.
Iran subsequently struck locations in Balochistan that it identified as Jaish al-Adl bases. Two days later, Pakistan launched retaliatory strikes inside Iran, marking the first time Pakistan had carried out military action within Iranian territory.
The two countries moved quickly to reduce tensions and agreed to strengthen security cooperation.
In June 2025, Pakistan condemned Israel’s attack on Iran and supported Tehran’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This position helped establish Islamabad’s credibility in Tehran ahead of its mediation efforts in 2026.
Questions about Pakistan’s neutrality resurfaced after a defence agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey came into effect. Iranian commentators questioned whether Islamabad could continue to act as an impartial mediator while maintaining such close security ties with Riyadh.
Iran’s trust in Pakistan is generally understood to rest on three main factors: their shared border and common security interests in Balochistan; Pakistan’s longstanding role as a channel of communication between Iran and the United States; and occasions when Islamabad has refused to take Iran’s side against it, including the 2015 Yemen war and the Israeli attacks in 2025.
Conversely, Iran’s confidence in Pakistan weakens whenever Islamabad moves closer to Saudi Arabia, supports Sunni militant organisations or fails to prevent cross-border attacks.
Pakistan’s ability to maintain its role as a mediator will therefore depend on whether it can continue balancing its security commitments to Saudi Arabia and its strategic relationship with the United States against the need to preserve working relations with Iran. With regional tensions rising and the risk of renewed US-Israeli attacks on Tehran hanging over the region, the sustainability of Islamabad’s diplomatic balancing act remains a central question.
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