Supreme Court Asserts Authority to Review Religious Practices for Superstition in Sabarimala Case

The court’s observation came amid hearings on a constitutional challenge concerning the balance between women’s rights and religious freedom, specifically the temple’s ban on girls and women aged 10-50. The bench stated, “The court has the jurisdiction to hold whether it (any practice) is superstitious. What will follow is for the legislature… how to deal with it. But in court you cannot say ‘whatever is the last word is what the legislature decides’. That cannot be…” The judges cited practices such as witchcraft, cannibalism, and sati to underline their position.

The remarks followed arguments by Solicitor-General Tushar Mehta, who contended that “a secular court cannot decide if something is superstition… they don’t have scholarly knowledge of the religion.” He added, “Your Lordships are experts in the field of law… not in the field of religion,” and pointed to India’s religious and cultural diversity, stating, “Something religious in Nagaland might be a superstition for me.” He also referenced Maharashtra’s Black Magic Act.

Responding to this, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah remarked, “Mr Mehta, you made it too simplistic…” Justice Joymalya Bagchi further questioned, “If witchcraft is considered part of religious practice, would you or would you not consider it superstition?” Mehta replied, “I will.”

Justice Bagchi then raised a constitutional scenario under Article 32, asking whether the court could intervene if approached over a religious practice of witchcraft where the legislature remains silent, invoking the principle of ‘unoccupied field’ to direct prohibition on grounds of public order and morality. Mehta responded that the court could act on grounds of public order, morality, and health, but not because it is superstition, adding that courts do not normally test jurisprudential doctrines through extreme examples. “That is part of jurisprudential theory,” he said.

Justice Bagchi countered, “But that is what we do… we stretch it (any principle) to absurd limits and test it (i.e., to assess the logical import of any argument made).”

Justice MM Sundresh emphasized that the federal government could not argue for a complete embargo on the court’s jurisdiction, stating, “… to say it is to completely denude the court of jurisdiction… the issue is of void and voidable action and, if it is violative like sati, the court can intervene.” Mehta replied, “I never argue that… because that argument always fails against the jurisdiction of the court. The court is always zealous to protect its jurisdiction… and rightly so.”

Justice BV Nagarathna highlighted that the court must determine ‘essential’ religious practices through the lens of the philosophy of that religion. “You cannot apply some other religion and say it is not ‘essential’ practice… but, of course subject to public order and morality. This is about how the court examines this and not whether it has jurisdiction or not,” she said.

Chief Justice Surya Kant acknowledged the limitations of judicial expertise, stating, “We cannot replace ourselves with subject experts,” but added that practices such as witchcraft, cannibalism, or human sacrifice that “shock the conscience of the court” may not require further adjudicatory exercise. “We are only examining how far such a matter can fall within judicial review,” he said.

On Tuesday, the government argued that India has historically placed women on a “higher pedestal.” It maintained that the Sabarimala restrictions are rooted in tradit

ion rather than discrimination, linked to the nature of Lord Ayyappa as an ‘eternal celibate’ and not based on notions of impurity or inferiority. The Centre further argued that religious practices cannot be judged solely through the lens of individual dignity or bodily autonomy, asserting, “Every religious denomination’s practices have to be respected.”

The proceedings underscore a critical constitutional debate on the extent of judicial review over religious practices, the limits of legislative authority, and the ongoing tension between faith, tradition, and fundamental rights.