India’s HF-24 Marut Program and the Echoes of Delay in the Tejas Fighter Project
India’s HF-24 Marut fighter program, initiated under Jawaharlal Nehru with HAL and Kurt Tank, faced critical engine shortages that limited performance despite combat use in 1971. The article examines its development, operational history, and parallels with delays in the Tejas fighter aircraft program and ongoing propulsion challenges.
HAL recruited renowned German aircraft designer Kurt Tank, noted for his work on the Focke-Wulf 190 fighter, the Ta 152 high-altitude interceptor, and the Focke-Wulf 200 Condor aircraft. In parallel, both the United States and the Soviet Union had also engaged former German aviation specialists to advance their aerospace programs.
Tank designed a sleek twin-engine fighter, conceptually capable of reaching Mach 2 speeds. In June 1961, the first prototype took flight under Wing Commander Suranjan Das. The historic event was witnessed by then Indian Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal A. M. Engineer, nuclear physicist Homi Bhabha, and Defence Secretary Reddy, marking India as the first non-superpower nation to fly a supersonic-capable jet aircraft.
However, the program soon encountered critical setbacks. The aircraft was originally intended to be powered by the Bristol Orpheus engine with afterburner capability, but government authorities declined to fund its development. Subsequent attempts by HAL to source alternative engines from Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States failed due to shifting political considerations and lack of approval.
As a result, the aircraft entered service in 1967 equipped with non-afterburning Orpheus 703 engines, producing approximately 4,850 pounds of thrust each, far below the planned 8,150 pounds. This shortfall left the fighter underpowered, unable to exceed Mach 1 in level flight, and effectively obsolete upon induction into the Indian Air Force.
Despite these limitations, the aircraft—later named the HF-24 Marut—was operationally deployed in No. 10 Squadron (Daggers), No. 31 Squadron (Lions), and No. 220 Squadron (Desert Tigers). During the 1971 war with Pakistan, Marut aircraft flew more than 200 sorties. At Longewala, they conducted ground-attack missions that destroyed 22 tanks and more than 100 vehicles, contributing significantly to the outcome of the battle. The aircraft also reportedly achieved an aerial victory against a Pakistani F-86 Sabre, with only four losses recorded during the conflict.
Nevertheless, the program’s long-term prospects were undermined by the same structural delays that constrained its engine development. Planned upgrades incorporating radar and missile systems were abandoned. Frustrated by thrust limitations, the Indian Air Force transitioned toward the SEPECAT Jaguar, an aircraft that also faced criticism over power constraints. By the 1980s, production costs and operational limitations led to the gradual phase-out of the Marut, with the final aircraft retired in 1990.
The HF-24 Marut ultimately stands as a cautionary example of how bureaucratic hesitation and delays in critical technology decisions can constrain indigenous defense programs. While India demonstrated engineering capability and strategic vision, the absence of timely propulsion development prevented the platform from reaching its full potential.
Today, similar concerns are being raised regarding the Tejas fighter aircraft program. The platform continues to face delays linked to engine supply constraints and integration challenges in achieving full operational capability. Notably, the aircraft has also relied on the same engine family used during its prototype phase. As global aviation technology advances rapidly, questions remain over whether ongoing delays could impact its ability to remain competitive.
The historical trajectory from the Marut to the Tejas highlights a persistent challenge in India’s defense aviation development: converting design ambition into sustained operational capability in the face of critical technological bottlenecks.

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