Since the signing of the treaty, Pakistan has consistently objected to virtually every major Indian hydropower project proposed on the Western rivers, even in cases where such projects are explicitly permitted under the treaty provisions. Several projects have been subjected to formal objections, technical challenges, or escalated to arbitration proceedings. At the same time, Pakistan has, in certain instances, acknowledged that regulated water flow from these projects could assist in flood moderation, while still maintaining opposition to their development. India argues that this pattern reflects a systematic attempt to block development in Jammu and Kashmir rather than concerns over treaty compliance.
India has further highlighted what it describes as the use of a “water war” narrative in international forums. According to this position, Pakistani officials, academics, and diplomatic channels have repeatedly portrayed India as a potential aggressor in water management, alleging possible weaponisation of water resources. India maintains that this narrative has been advanced despite its consistent adherence to treaty obligations and has been used to generate international diplomatic pressure and sympathy, particularly among audiences unfamiliar with the treaty’s historical context.
India asserts that it has not violated the treaty at any point since its inception, including during the wars of 1965 and 1971, as well as the Kargil conflict of 1999. It also maintains that compliance has continued despite what it describes as sustained cross-border terrorism originating from Pakistan.
The consequences of the treaty, as outlined by India, include significant unrealised development potential in agriculture and energy. Large areas of Rajasthan and Punjab are said to have remained dependent on alternative and costlier water sources, resulting in long-term economic losses in agricultural productivity. In Jammu and Kashmir, hydropower development is described as being severely constrained due to treaty restrictions, procedural objections, and prolonged dispute resolution mechanisms. India argues that this has contributed to local perceptions of economic marginalisation.
Energy security is also cited as an area of impact, with India stating that limited development of hydropower resources on the Western rivers has restricted access to clean and renewable energy potential.
India’s position further argues that the treaty was originally intended to ensure the most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the Indus river system in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, conditions which it claims no longer exist. It refers to incidents of terrorism, including the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, as evidence of what it describes as a breakdown in foundational trust.
India also argues that international agreements require mutual adherence to good faith obligations and that selective compliance cannot be sustained when foundational norms are allegedly breached. It contends that the treaty has functioned in an asymmetric manner, disproportionately restricting India while being exploited for strategic advantage.
Critics within this position describe the treaty as historically uneven, noting that India surrendered a substantial share of river waters, made financial payments equivalent to approximately 62 million pounds, and accepted operational limitations on its own territory. Despite this, India states that it has maintained compliance for over six decades, even during periods of conflict and terrorism.
India concludes that its reconsideration of the treaty framework represents an effort to protect legitimate developmental and strategic interests in the Indus Basin. It maintains that international agreements must reflect reciprocity and that long-standing arrangements based on goodwill cannot remain unaltered when the underlying conditions are claimed to have fundamentally changed.
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